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Abstract 
Although the modelling of interactions has long been at the core of socio-technical 
systems theory, and is a key for understanding resilience, there is a lack of a holistic 
taxonomy of interactions. This study introduces a taxonomy of interactions to be used in 
association with the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). The taxonomy has 
nine criteria: nature of agents, output nature, levelling, waiting time, distance, degree of 
coupling, visibility, safety and/or security hazards, and parallel replications. For each 
criterion, two descriptors are proposed: what the interaction looks like; and - when 
applicable - the variability level of the interaction. The use of the taxonomy is presented 
for three systems with clearly distinct complexity characteristics: cash withdrawal from 
an ATM, teaching a university course, and manufacturing operations. These case studies 
indicate the usefulness of the taxonomy for the identification of leverage points in work 
system design. They also show the value of modelling the variability of the interactions 
in FRAM models, in addition to the traditional modelling of the variability of the outputs 
of functions. Implications of the taxonomy for resilience engineering are discussed.  
Keywords: interactions, socio-technical systems, complex systems, FRAM, human 
factors, taxonomy.   
 
  
A taxonomy of interactions in socio-technical systems: A functional 
perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The modelling of interactions has long been at the core of socio-technical systems theory 
and systems-oriented safety approaches (Clegg, 2000). In the 1940´s, the studies by the 
Tavistock institute in coal mines concluded that the best performance arises from the 
harmonic interaction between the social and the technical systems (Trist and Bamforth, 
1951). More recently, the concept of joint cognitive systems also relies on the notion of 
interactions, by assuming that the human and non-human agents in work systems form an 
inseparable adaptive ensemble (Hollnagel and Woods, 2005). The definition of 
ergonomics also highlights interactions: according to Wilson (2014) “ergonomics is the 
theoretical and fundamental understanding of human behaviour and performance in 
purposeful interacting sociotechnical systems, and the application of that understanding 
to design of interactions in the context of real settings”. In turn, the growing interest of 
human factors researchers in complexity science (Walker et al., 2010) has put a spotlight 
on dynamic interactions, which are a defining feature of complex socio-technical systems 
(CSSs) (Cilliers, 1998).  
 
Furthermore, a number of modelling approaches used in human factors, such as agent-
based modelling (Baber et al., 2013), social network analysis (Houghton et al., 2006), and 
the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012), are essentially 
about the modelling of interactions. On this context, it is possibly no overstatement to say 
that the design of means for modelling and coping with interactions is the main concern 
of current research on systems-oriented human factors approaches. Some examples of 
recent studies, explicitly relying on the concept of interactions can be mentioned. Bolbot 
et al. (2019) discuss the vulnerabilities intrinsic to tight and complex interactions in cyber-
physical systems. Klockner and Toft (2018) investigated rail safety occurrences and 
modelled contributing factors as a network of interacting factors. Maguire (2014) 
discusses the impacts of the new ways of working on the interactions between users and 
information and communication technologies.              
 
Regardless of the key role played by interactions, there is a lack of holistic taxonomies 
for modelling what they look like under different circumstances. Perrow (1984) proposed 
the most well-known taxonomy of interactions in CSSs, according to two axes: from 
linear to non-linear interactions, and from tightly to loosely-coupled. While these are core 
dimensions of interactions, they are hardly operationalized as metrics and may be 
themselves emergent outcomes of other hidden system features. For example, Perrow 
defines linear interactions as those in expected and familiar sequences, quite visible even 
if unplanned, and characterized by the proportionality between cause and effect. This 
definition encompasses attributes that could be assessed by their own, namely the 
observer’s familiarity with the interaction, the visibility of the interaction, and its impacts. 
Furthermore, the two characteristics mentioned by Perrow are functional, rather than 
structural, properties of a socio-technical system. This means that they change over time 
(El Maraghy et al., 2014), and this might be due to the variability of their underlying 
contributing factors. The understanding of the said factors may be useful when having the 
objective of influencing the system through design.         
 
Given this context, the research question addressed by this study is stated as follows: how 
should a taxonomy for interactions be defined for supporting socio-technical work 
system’s design and analysis? The use of taxonomies in human factors is common, as it 
serves several purposes, such as (Olsen and Shorrock, 2010) the definition of a vocabulary 
for sharing information as well as support to decision-making in design by highlighting 
system trends, strengths, and weaknesses. Examples of such taxonomies can be cited, 
such as a taxonomy of slack proposed by Saurin and Werle (2017) and the human factors 
analysis and classification system, applied to the study of human errors in aviation 
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001).  
 
The taxonomy of interactions proposed in this study is intended to be compatible with the 
FRAM, which has been the main modelling tool in resilience engineering (Hollnagel, 
2012). There are two main reasons for choosing the FRAM, namely: (i) its functional 
emphasis, which is a key for modelling dynamic interactions; and (ii) it can in principle 
be applied to the modelling of any interaction type (e.g. social interactions, flow of 
materials, logical dependence), which implies in a broader scope when compared with 
other approaches. FRAM’s potential in these regards has been largely confirmed in a 
variety of socio-technical systems, such as healthcare (Clay-Williams et al., 2015), 
aviation (Patriarca et al., 2017a), and maritime operations (Praetorius et al., 2016). The 
applicability of the taxonomy is illustrated using three systems with clearly distinct 
complexity characteristics: cash withdrawal from an ATM, teaching a university course, 
and manufacturing operations. These case studies also support a discussion of the 
implications of the taxonomy for the potentials of resilient systems proposed by Hollnagel 
(2017). 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 A socio-technical perspective for the investigation of interactions  
 
In this study, the concept of interactions is explored from a socio-technical perspective 
where technological, human, social and environmental components cannot be optimized 
individually (Trist, 1981). These components form a cooperative ensemble, and the 
overall system performance is mostly a function of their interactions rather than their 
individual properties (Hollnagel, 1998). Empirical evidence supporting this view has been 
gathered in a wide range of socio-technical domains (e.g. Akyuz and Celik, 2015). 
 
In particular, studying in detail the interaction between technology and users is crucial to 
limit unintended consequences (Nielsen, 1990). Over years, automation acquired an 
increasingly central role, as proved by the large number of different models put forward 
for studying human-automation interaction (Parasuraman et al., 2000). In this domain, 
one early attempt of modelling interactions consisted of assigning tasks to machines or to 
humans following the MABA-MABA logic (men are better at; machines are better at) 
(Fitts, 1951).  
 
Furthermore, it has been early acknowledged that the inherent complexity of socio-
technical systems requires to take into account interactions at different levels of 
abstraction (Rasmussen, 1985). Such multi-layer structural decomposition model has 
been further revised through a functional deconstruction approach based on FRAM 
(Patriarca et al., 2017b). Consequently, a socio-technical perspective implies that the 
study of interactions has to acknowledge both abstract classification of roles assigned to 
social and technical aspects of work, and less abstract interactions to be usable for system 
modelling (Baxter and Sommerville, 2011). Regarding more concrete aspects of system 
interactions, Mayer et al. (2014) define different ranges of interactors, either tangible such 
as physical buttons or knobs, or intangible such as software, graphical user interfaces, 
gesture or speech-control interfaces.  
 
2.2 Interactions and FRAM 
 
The FRAM is a method for modelling the performance of socio-technical systems, relying 
on the identification of variability and how it may aggregate within a work domain. It is 
a viable solution to explore how variability interacts leading to outcomes that are either 
expected or unexpected, considering interactions at different abstraction levels 
(Hollnagel, 2012). 
 
The FRAM specifies interactions in terms of the relationship between the Output O of an 
upstream function, and any other aspect (Input I, Precondition P, Resource R, Control C, 
and Time T) of a downstream function. An interaction means that an output can 
(Hollnagel, 2012): trigger the start of another function (I); set a precondition for the start 
of another function, although this by itself does not start the function (P); increase or 
decrease as a result of carrying out the function (R); set expectations and thresholds of 
acceptable performance (C); set time constraints/relationships for performing the function 
(T). In the FRAM vocabulary, these relationships are referred to as couplings, which are 
hereafter interpreted as a synonym of interaction. 
  
A core part of applying the FRAM is the assessment of the variability of the outputs of 
each function. Hollnagel (2012) proposes that an elaborate analysis should account for 
ten dimensions of variability: timing, duration, distance / length, direction, magnitude, 
speed, force/power/pressure, object, quantity/volume, and sequence. The simple analysis 
of variability, which according to Hollnagel may be sufficient in most cases, only 
accounts for the variability in terms of timing and precision. 
 
3. The process development of the taxonomy 
 
The taxonomy process development was based on contributions from literature, case 
studies, and feedback from a pool of experts. This process had an iterative and 
incremental nature (Figure 1), which in principle could continue perpetually.  
 
 
Figure 1. Iterative process for developing the taxonomy  
The first iterative sub-process (literature review – items specification) was mainly related 
to the analysis of literature. We decided to start from Scopus database, which is the largest 
repository for scientific articles, and select articles which contained “functional resonance 
analysis method” in title or abstract or keywords. Starting from the contributions obtained 
from the literature search (76 documents, indexed in Scopus until 30th November 2018), 
a content analysis was performed to identify pieces of content in relation to interactions 
in the context of FRAM, systematically labelling the contents. Each paper was examined 
in terms of the presence or absence of potential attributes of interactions (i.e. the first set 
of taxonomy items).  
 
The second iterative sub-process (case studies application by authors – items 
specification) was oriented to the adoption of the taxonomy to two case studies in order 
to test its applicability in different contexts. The case studies referred to teaching a 
University course, and forging operations in a manufacturing plant. To assess the 
reliability of the taxonomy, an inter-reliability criterion has been adopted, i.e. Cohen 
kappa (Cohen, 1960). Following the interpretation of Landis and Koch (1977), the values 
of the inter-reliability analyses confirmed an almost perfect agreement (about 0.90) for 
the case studies.  
 
The third iteration sub-process (case study application by experts – items revision) was 
aimed to further increase the reliability of the taxonomy. For this purpose, seven 
international experts (four from Italy, two from Brazil, one from Australia) were invited 
to use the taxonomy for the same case study. The experts all have more than three years 
of research experience with the FRAM: one MSc student with a thesis on FRAM, two 
PhD students, one assistant professor, two associate professors, and one senior researcher. 
Except for the MSc student, all the experts had experience both at theoretical level (as 
confirmed by their authored publications in the topic) and industrial level (confirmed by 
the projects they managed on FRAM) and joined the international FRAM community (the 
so called FRAMily), which make them a credible pool of validators. 
 
In this case, a simple process was selected to minimize the background bias of experts, 
i.e. cash withdrawal. To remove further biases, a video recorded by one of the authors 
was shared among experts. Every expert was asked to apply the taxonomy to two 
interactions selected from the FRAM model of cash withdrawal and then answer to two 
questions:  “Is the taxonomy item understandable?” “Is the taxonomy item helpful”, with 
one of the following choices: none, to a small degree, to a high degree, to a very high 
degree. The process was conducted through the usage of an ad hoc online spreadsheet, 
and, where necessary, semi-structured interviews to discuss the assigned values.  
 
4. The taxonomy of interactions 
 
Our operational definition of interaction, which underlies the taxonomy, is as follows: 
any dependence relationship between two functions in a FRAM model, which does not 
necessarily involve the exchange of physical or information flows. The taxonomy is 
comprised of nine criteria: seven original ones, one criterion (i.e. nature of agents) 
adapted from the FRAM, and another criterion originally proposed by the FRAM (i.e. 
output nature). The criteria and the descriptors of their performance levels, when 
applicable, are presented below. 
      
(i) Nature of agents: according to the original FRAM proposal, the agents who perform 
functions can be humans, technologies or organizations (Hollnagel, 2012). Natural agents 
(e.g. animals, soil, atmosphere, oceans, etc.) could be another relevant type in some 
systems. In general, interactions involving human and organizational agents tend to be 
more variable than those involving only technical agents (Hollnagel, 2012). In a same 
function there may be a mix of the said types and these can be further sub-divided if 
necessary. The descriptors for this criterion are then:  
− human/individual;  
− human/team; 
− technology/software; 
− technology/hardware; 
− natural agent; 
− organizational agent.  
 
As for the assessment of variability associated with this criterion, three main levels are 
proposed: 
− Low variability: agents at both ends (i.e. upstream and downstream) usually have 
the same nature;   
− Moderate variability: agents at both ends sometimes have the same nature;  
− High variability: agents at both ends usually have a different nature.       
 
(ii) Output nature: in the FRAM, an output is the result of the function, either an entity 
or a state change – these two are the descriptors of this criterion. An entity corresponds 
to an output that has a physical nature and is physically transformed as a result of the 
function. For instance, the output “medication administered”, arising from the function 
<administer medication>, might be framed as an entity to the extent that the medication 
has a physical nature and was physically transformed as a result of being administered.  
         
A state change corresponds to outputs of any nature (i.e. physical and non-physical) that 
change a non-physical characteristic (e.g. location, information content) as a result of the 
function. For instance, although “supplies stored” may be an output of the function <store 
supplies>, the supplies themselves do not physically change as a result of the function – 
only the location changes. As for the output variability, the two main phenotypes 
proposed by Hollnagel (2012) are adopted, as follows:  
− Timing: on time, too late, too early, not at all;  
− Precision: precise, acceptable, imprecise. 
 
(iii) Levelling: this refers to whether the output production volume (i.e. amount of 
outputs) and mix (i.e. type variations of an output, such as old and young patients in a 
hospital, transactions types in a bank) vary over the time of the day and day of the week. 
Unlevelled production (e.g. a surge of trauma patients in an emergency department) tends 
to stress production resources in certain moments, while these may be idle most of the 
time (Hopp, 2018). Given its nature, the descriptor of what the criterion looks like and its 
variability can be merged, as follows:    
− Levelled: both mix and volume do not vary substantially over time;  
− Moderately levelled: either mix or volume vary substantially over time; 
− Unlevelled: both mix and volume vary substantially over time. 
 
(iv) Waiting time: this refers to the time it takes after the output is produced by the 
upstream function up to its actual use by a downstream function. Thus, what is measured 
is the waiting time from output production to consumption. This is the main difference 
between the waiting time criterion and the time aspect of the FRAM functions. The 
traditional FRAM aspect is concerned with the time constraints of the function itself (e.g. 
start time, end time, time pressure) rather than taking the perspective of the waiting time. 
On the one hand, short waiting time tends to be desirable when the output (e.g. a patient, 
fresh food) properties can deteriorate in the face of long waiting. On the other hand, long 
waiting time may be desirable when it means a greater time window for the setup of 
production resources and problem-solving.  
 
Since what counts as a short or long waiting time is context dependent, the descriptors 
related to this category are aimed at supporting a formalized recording of information, 
rather than comparisons between FRAM models. The descriptors are then as follows:  
− Tight waiting time; 
− Medium waiting time; 
− Long waiting time.  
The quantitative values of such categories depend on the system at hand, and could be 
(e.g.): up to 1 minute (tight), up to 1 hour (medium), up to 1 hour and more (long).  
 
Regarding variability, three levels are proposed: 
− Low variability: waiting time’s values are usually the same; 
− Moderate variability: waiting time’s values are sometimes the same;  
− High variability: waiting time’s values are usually different. 
 
(v) Distance: this criterion refers to the physical distance travelled by the output when 
moving from an upstream to a downstream function. As such, distance is only a relevant 
criterion for interactions that involve the flow of outputs among functions. The longer the 
distance travelled by the output the more it is exposed to the external environment 
variability. Distance may be a relevant consideration even when the energy flowing is 
that of electronic signals (Kirilenko et al., 2017). 
 
Similarly to waiting time, what counts as long or short distance is context-dependent. 
Thus, descriptors related to this category are also aimed at supporting standardized 
information recording rather than comparisons between FRAM models. The descriptors 
are:  
− Short distance;  
− Medium distance;  
− Long distance.  
Exemplar classification of distance range are proposed: up to 1 m (short); up to 100 m 
(medium), up to 1000 m and more (long).   
 
In relation to variability, three levels are proposed: 
− Low variability: distance’s values are usually the same; 
− Moderate variability: distance’s values are sometimes the same;  
− High variability: distance’s values are usually different. 
 
(vi) Degree of coupling: this refers to the distinction between tightly and loosely coupled 
interactions, which can be interpreted as two ends of a continuum. The degree of coupling 
is closely related to the notion of slack, since the more slack the looser the couplings. 
Slack is a mechanism for reducing interdependencies and minimizing the possibility of 
one process affecting another, and thus it makes processes loosely-coupled (Safayeni and 
Purdy, 1991). From a FRAM viewpoint, there may be slack functions triggered by the 
output variability of upstream functions (Saurin and Werle, 2017). Similar to criterion 
(iii), variability is an integral part of this criterion and therefore the descriptor of what the 
criterion looks like and its variability can be merged, as follows: 
− Tightly-coupled: there are no realistic alternative means to produce and use the 
upstream output. Neither waiting time nor distance are long; 
− Moderately-coupled: there is at least one realistic alternative means to produce 
and use the upstream output. Either waiting time or distance are long;  
− Loosely-coupled: there are two or more realistic alternative means to produce and 
use the upstream output. Waiting time and distance are long.          
 
(vii) Visibility: this refers to the degree to which the interaction is self-explaining, without 
the need for verbal communication (Galsworth, 2017). The more visible the interaction, 
the easier tends to be its monitoring and understanding, thus reducing perceived 
complexity (Ramasesh and Browning, 2014). The visibility of the output of the upstream 
function and its status are approached from two perspectives: how visible the output and 
its status (e.g. late, precise) are to the agents at the downstream function, and how visible 
the output and its status are to other agents in the environment. An output can be “visible” 
in a physical sense, but still be invisible from the eyes of an untrained observer. Also, 
visibility can be obtained through indirect means, such as instrumentation and videos. 
The descriptors corresponding to visibility are:  
− High visibility: the output itself and its status are visible both to the downstream 
agent and to agents in the environment, and there is no reliance on indirect sources 
of information;   
− Low visibility: neither the output nor its status are visible, from the perspective of 
both the downstream agent and agents in the environment. There is reliance on 
indirect sources of information;  
− Moderate visibility: any situation in which the previous two descriptors do not 
hold true.   
 
Regarding variability, the proposed levels are as follows: 
− Low variability: visibility levels are usually the same; 
− Moderate variability: visibility levels are sometimes the same; 
− High variability: visibility levels are usually different.  
 
(viii) Safety and/or security hazards: a hazard is a “condition or object with the 
potential of causing injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of 
material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function” (FAA, 2009). There are 
two dimensions for exploring this category, namely the hazardous properties of the output 
and the vulnerability of the output to hazards in the environment. There may be either 
safety implications, when the hazards are unintentionally released and no harm is desired 
(e.g. occupational accidents), or security implications, when there is an intention to 
release the hazard and cause harm (e.g. terrorism). This criterion does not account for 
emergent hazards arising from several interdependent interactions. The descriptors are 
presented below, and separate assessments should be carried out for safety and security 
hazards.   
− No safety (and/or security) hazards: the output has no relevant hazardous 
properties and the environment does not pose any significant hazards to the 
output;   
− Either the output is hazardous or the environment poses hazards to the output 
(safety and/or security);  
− The output has hazardous properties and the environment poses significant 
hazards to the output (safety and/or security). 
 
The variability of the safety/security hazards is mostly linked to where the output and its 
environment are positioned in a continuum ranging from a technical to a socio-technical 
system. The closer to a purely technical system (e.g. a product with toxic properties), the 
less variable the hazards tends to be. As such, the proposed variability levels are as 
follows: 
− High variability: hazard is dynamic, changing over time and under conditions that 
cannot be easily anticipated; 
− Moderate variability: hazard is dynamic, changing over time and under conditions 
that can be easily anticipated (e.g. hour of the day, day of the week, location, 
weather);  
− Low variability: hazard is static, not changing over time.  
 
(ix) Parallel replications: the traditional FRAM models do not make it clear how many 
replications a same function has in a given moment in time. For instance, there may be a 
generic function <administer medications to patients> performed by a generic nurse. 
However, in reality, there may be several nurses doing the same function in parallel. As 
such, we propose that, when replication occurs, an estimate of the number of parallel 
replications should be acknowledged. Furthermore, information on the maximum number 
of possible parallel replications sheds light on the overall capacity of the system, which 
can be checked against demand.  
More replications create more opportunities for unintended and non-linear interactions. 
These may be beneficial if there is a possibility of relocating resources if necessary, and 
thus loosening couplings that otherwise would be tighter – e.g. nurse A who is 
administering medications to a patient may provide advice on how to administer 
medications to nurse B who is in the same room caring another patient. The descriptors 
for this criterion are as follows:  
− No parallel replications;  
− Medium number of parallel replications;  
− Large number of parallel replications.  
These descriptors are context-dependent as well, but exemplar values could be: medium 
(up to ten), large (up to hundreds, and more). 
 
Variability levels are applicable to this criterion, and the levels as follows are proposed: 
− Low variability: parallel replication values are usually the same;  
− Moderate variability: parallel replication values are sometimes the same; 
− High variability: parallel replication values are usually different;  
 
5. The process of applying the taxonomy in the case studies 
 
5.1 Selection of case studies and steps for applying the taxonomy  
 
The steps for applying the taxonomy were the same in all cases, as follows:      
 
Step 1: the development of a FRAM model and a corresponding instantiation of this 
model, either involving a past event, the present everyday work, or a future scenario;  
Step 2: since a FRAM model may have dozens of interactions, it is not practical to apply 
the taxonomy for all of them. Thus, some interactions should be prioritized. Two 
prioritization criteria are proposed, namely: interactions involving functions that directly 
produce the main output of the whole system (e.g. administering classes in the teaching 
case study); and interactions that have a larger number of upstream and downstream 
couplings – i.e. functions with higher in-degree and out-degree values; 
Step 3: application of the taxonomy for the selected interactions; 
Step 4: the proposition of recommendations for influencing the interactions in the desired 
direction, if necessary. First, the possibility of eliminating interactions should be 
considered, since this can make the system less vulnerable to unexpected and undesired 
interactions. Second, it is necessary to appreciate whether the removal of any interaction 
does not imply in creating compensating interactions, which may bring up their own even 
worse risks. Third, if the interaction cannot be eliminated, it should be verified whether 
it is necessary and possible to influence it by design, using the results of applying the 
taxonomy as a source of improvement opportunities identification.  
 
5.2 Data collection and analysis  
 
The taxonomy was tested in three case studies, which set a basis for its evaluation. The 
cases represent markedly different systems, thus allowing for the investigation of the 
applicability of the taxonomy to different contexts. The cases involved: cash withdrawal 
from an ATM; teaching a University course; and forging operations in a manufacturing 
plant. 
 
The cash withdrawal is the case study used in the third iterative sub-process (cf. §3.2.c) 
whose main source of data was the filming of a withdrawal carried out by one of the 
authors of this paper. The ATM was located within the private premises of a bank branch, 
and the film was recorded on a weekend, when there was no one else in the facility. This 
was useful to avoid interruptions and to model a simple situation. Based on watching the 
film multiple times (about 3 minutes), the usual steps for developing a FRAM model were 
followed (Hollnagel, 2012). Given the routine nature of this activity, the identification of 
functions and variability sources was fairly straightforward. 
 
The teaching case refers to one of the two case studies for taxonomy application by the 
authors of this paper (cf. §3.2.b). It was based on the experience of the authors who have 
both administered graduate and undergraduate courses for several years. The FRAM 
model corresponds to an everyday class at the undergraduate level, in the context of the 
institution of one of the authors. There was no formal data collection in this case, given 
the deep insider’s experience of the researchers. This case study has been selected since 
it may represent an easy exemplar validation of the taxonomy.  
 
The third example refers to forging operation in a manufacturing plant (second of the two 
case studies for taxonomy application by the authors of this paper). Data in this case were 
gathered by means of documents, focus groups, semi-structured interviews, and 
observations. This example was chosen because the authors have both experience in 
industrial operations, with one of the authors participating in the original model 
development, documented in Gattola et al. (2018). 
 
For the three case studies, some interactions were selected for applying the taxonomy 
based on the previously mentioned criteria and application steps. In the cash withdrawal 
case study, in case of disagreement, it is reported the most frequent item selected in the 
taxonomy by the experts (cf. §3.2.c). 
 
6. Results   
 
6.1 The cash withdrawal case  
 
Figure 2 presents the FRAM instantiation for the cash withdrawal case. The function on 
the top, <monitor transaction>, is performed by the software that controls the operation. 
Each function carried out by the customer, such as <insert card>, sends an electronic 
signal that is an input for <monitor transaction>. Then, the software releases the next 
screen and sets a time limit for performing the next function. Therefore, the output of 
<monitor transaction> is coupled with the time aspect of other functions.    
 
Figure 2. FRAM instantiation of the cash withdrawal case study. Notes: (i) functions in red are those 
selected for analysis; (ii) waves inside the hexagons indicate variability in the function’s output. 
 
Considering that the interactions shown in Figure 2 are similar, only two were selected 
for applying the taxonomy (Table 1): I-1 <insert card> - <monitor transaction>, and I-2 
<type PIN> - <retrieve cash>.  
 
Table 1. Application of the taxonomy to the ATM cash withdrawal case study. Note: the results 
according to the descriptors previously presented are in Italics. 
Taxonomy category / 
Interaction  
I-1: insert card – monitor transaction  I-2: type PIN – retrieve cash  
 
 
 
Nature of the agents 
Human/Individual – Technology/Software  
 
Moderate variability: sometimes there are 
different ATM models in the same branch, and 
there are demographic variations in the 
customers (old vs. young, literate vs. illiterate, 
blind vs. non-blind)     
Human/Individual – Human/Individual  
 
Low variability: the same person is doing two 
consecutive functions, moderated by the function 
<monitor transaction>   
 
Output nature 
State change 
 
Acceptable precision: sometimes the ATM 
does not read the card at the first time it is 
inserted   
State change  
 
Imprecise: slips and memory lapses when typing 
the PIN are common   
Levelling Moderately levelled: demand for the ATM 
increases around noon, while the mix probably 
does not change overtime    
Moderately levelled 
 
 
 
Waiting time  
Tight waiting time: there is virtually no 
significant delay after inserting the card and 
the detection of this action by the computer 
 
Low variability 
Tight waiting time. Low variability. After typing 
the PIN, a few seconds pass up to the release of 
cash. If not removed briefly, the cash is pulled back 
into the ATM.   
Distance  Short distance. Low variability. 
 
Short distance. Low variability. 
 
Degree of coupling 
Tightly-coupled: there is no alternative means 
of producing and using this output after 
starting the upstream function    
Tightly-coupled  
 
 
 
 
Visibility  
High visibility: from the perspective of both 
the environment and downstream agent (i.e. 
computer), visibility is high, since the 
computer promptly detects the card insertion 
 
Low variability    
Moderate visibility: although the upstream and 
downstream agents are the same, the PIN appears 
on the screen only as ****  
 
Low variability 
 
 
 
Safety and/or security 
hazards 
No safety hazards 
No security hazards 
Low variability 
No safety hazards 
 
Either the output or its environment has security 
hazards: If a large amount of cash is removed at 
once, this may call the attention of people around. 
However, this is unlikely given the daily 
withdrawal limits set by the bank.  
 
High variability: the location of the ATM (e.g. 
region within a given city) has an influence on the 
security hazards    
 
Parallel replications 
No parallel replications: in the specific 
instantiated scenario, there were no other 
people using the existing three neighbouring 
ATM  
 
Moderate variability: the number of 
replications depends on the size of the branch 
No parallel replications 
Moderate variability 
 
 
The main lessons learned from this case study are as follows: (i) redundant ATM on 
standby offers an alternative for transforming a tightly-coupled system of interactions into 
a loosely-coupled one – e.g. using a neighbouring ATM if there is a technical failure in 
any of them; (ii) variability in terms of nature of agents may be a drawback, in face of an 
inflexible software/hardware; and (iii) need for visibility is contingent. On the one hand, 
the lack of visibility of the PIN made sense in I-2. On the other hand, it could be beneficial 
if visibility was given to the time available for the consumption of the output by the 
downstream function –e.g. the output of <type amount> will vanish if not consumed 
within a certain time limit set by the ATM software. 
 
Improvement opportunities arising from using the taxonomy may be highlighted, namely: 
(i) to develop a more flexible software/hardware, which can be adaptable to different 
profiles of users – e.g. touch screens that allow for enlarging the characters, use of icons 
as a support for non-native speakers and illiterate people; and (ii) to give visibility for the 
time available for performing the next function – e.g. by posting a countdown on the 
screen. Besides, some interactions can be eliminated due to the introduction of new 
human-computer interfaces in the near future – e.g. the client could be automatically 
identified based on his/her iris, eliminating the need for cards. Elimination of the 
keyboard is less likely to be useful, since it provides privacy that would be compromised 
if voice commands were used in public spaces. 
 
6.2 The teaching case 
 
Figure 3 presents the FRAM instantiation for a scenario of teaching a course at 
undergraduate level. Classes typically occur once or twice a week, for groups of 30 
students. According to the defined boundaries, the starting function is <go to the 
University - professor>. Once arriving at the building entrance hall, which is located on 
the ground floor (there are 7 floors), the function <collect classroom keys> is performed. 
The keys of all classrooms are stored in the reception desk, in which a security guard 
makes written records of who collects each key and when. The output of the collect keys 
function is often late because the keys are not available. This usually occurs either because 
the keys were not returned to the security guard by the person who was in the classroom, 
or because there is still someone in there. This triggers the need for looking for the keys 
elsewhere and may delay the downstream functions. After having access to the classroom, 
the function <switch on computer and other equipment – e.g. slide projector> is 
conducted. As a precondition for this function, the output of <maintain computers and 
other equipment> should be precise and on-time. There are two main inputs for the core 
adding-value function <administer class>: the upload of slides on the computers and the 
presence of a minimum number of students in class – the start can be delayed a few 
minutes since many students can be late. The downstream boundary of the model is the 
function <apply knowledge>, which is performed by the students and is influenced by the 
variability of all upstream functions, besides a number of contextual factors not 
encompassed by the model. 
 
Table 2 presents what three interactions look like in light of the taxonomy. The selected 
interactions (I) are: I-1 <give keys back to security> - <collect classroom-keys>, I-2 
<administer class> - <apply knowledge>, and I-3 <maintain computers and other 
equipment> - <switch on computers and other equipment>. These interactions involve 
the main human agents participating in the system (professor, students, IT staff, and 
security), as well as technological artefacts. 
 
Figure 3. FRAM instantiation of the teaching case study.  
 
 
Table 2. Application of the taxonomy to the teaching case study.  
Taxonomy 
category / 
Interaction  
I-1: return keys – collect keys  I-2: administer class – apply 
knowledge  
I-3: maintain computer and 
other equipment – switch on 
computer and other 
equipment 
 
 
Nature of the 
agents 
Human/Individual – 
Human/Individual 
 
Moderate variability: the person 
who gives back the keys may not be 
the same who collected the keys.  
Human/Individual – 
Human/Individual  
 
Moderate variability: sometimes 
knowledge is applied by students as 
part of teamwork 
Human/Team – 
Human/Individual 
 
Low variability  
 
Output nature 
State change 
 
Imprecise and not at all: sometimes 
the person in charge of the keys 
forgets to give these back   
State change 
 
Acceptable precision: the quality of 
the lecture depends on a number of 
factors – e.g. fatigue  
Entity 
 
Too late and acceptable 
precision: it is often delayed, 
problems not definitely solved   
 
 
Levelling 
Unlevelled Levelled: the output of <administer 
class> is stable in terms of mix and 
volume. However, the use of this as 
an input for <apply knowledge> is 
irregular. There may be accumulation 
of knowledge waiting to be used.   
Moderately levelled: frequency 
of corrective maintenance 
varies over time. Mix is more 
stable.   
 
 
 
 
Waiting time  
Long  
 
High variability: the waiting time 
varies from a few minutes to several 
hours, depending on the schedule of 
classroom occupation     
Long  
 
High variability: the waiting time 
between the output production and its 
use can vary from days to months or 
even years.  
Medium   
 
High variability: it can vary 
from minutes to days, since the 
corrective maintenance 
activities occur on demand, and 
there may be other priorities 
Distance  Short  
 
Low variability  
Long  
High variability  
 
 
Short  
Low variability  
Degree of 
coupling 
Moderately coupled: there is a spare 
key set in each department 
reception area.  
Loosely-coupled: there are many 
possible ways of using the output of 
<administer class>, and there is a 
significant slack in terms of time  
Loosely-coupled: there are 
several other desktops in the 
classrooms, which could be a 
replacement  
Visibility  Low visibility: there is a low 
visibility for the downstream agent, 
since the person who collects the 
key does not know in advance 
whether or not the keys were 
returned. High visibility for agents 
in the environment.     
 
Low variability 
High visibility: there is a high 
visibility for the downstream agents, 
since the students attend the class. 
 
Moderate variability: although the 
class is visible in a physical sense, 
there may be wide variations 
regarding students perceptions     
Low visibility: the downstream 
agent (professor) has no visual 
cues on the maintenance status 
of computers and equipment.  
 
Low variability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety and/or 
security hazards 
No safety hazards 
No security hazards 
Low variability 
No safety hazards 
No security hazards 
Low variability 
Either the output or its 
environment have safety 
hazards: inadequate 
maintenance of electrical 
equipment can pose safety 
hazards  
 
Moderate variability: it 
depends on the age of the 
equipment and the nature of the 
faulty maintenance 
 
No security hazards 
 
 
 
Parallel 
replications 
No parallel replications 
 
Moderate variability 
No parallel replications: although the 
same course may be given by the 
same or another professor (to another 
class), it does not occur in parallel   
 
Low variability 
 
 
Medium number of parallel 
replications: maintenance 
activities in parallel are 
common, given that there are 
several maintenance staff 
 
Moderate variability: it 
depends on the variation in 
demand for maintenance  
  
Some insights from Table 2 may be highlighted, namely: (i) visibility was high only when 
the downstream agent was physically present in the same environment where the 
upstream output was produced (i.e. in the case of I-2); and (ii) replications that occur in 
different moments in time (e.g. the same class to a similar group of students, at another 
time) may also offer an opportunity for loosely-couplings as well as for learning from 
experience. 
 
Re-design recommendations start by considering the elimination of unnecessary 
complexity. For instance, I-1 (return keys – collect keys) could be eliminated if 
classrooms were kept permanently unlocked during business hours. While this could 
create security threats, as well as new functions (e.g. an administrative employee opening 
the rooms at the beginning of the day and closing them at the end of the day), these would 
have a low frequency, and probably a complexity reduction net effect. Furthermore, the 
visibility of some interactions can be enhanced – e.g. by posting a schedule of planned 
versus actual preventive maintenance on public display. 
             
 6.3 The manufacturing case  
 
This case study is inspired by a previous research conducted in a metalworking company 
producing power-tools accessories (Gattola et al., 2018). The plant produces a wide 
variety of products, which can be grouped into three main families, depending on the 
dimension. The main production process is divided into six phases: turning, milling, 
forging, tempering, sandblasting and packaging. 
 
The focus of this case study is on the forging operation, which is the most critical part of 
the production process. At the beginning of every work-shift, the operator performs a 
conformity check following the so-called 6S check, which includes routine functions such 
as <control oil level>, <control cooling water filter>, <control collective and individual 
barriers>, <clean machine floor>, and <clean machine panels>. Production can only start 
after the forging machine is properly setup. The operator’s functions are then <turn on 
the machine> and after positioning the raw material in the belt of the machine, she <move 
and heat the raw material>, and <forge the semi-finished product> by means of a standard 
load automatically provided by the machine. In case of a technical problem encountered 
in the setup procedure, the operator in charge of the process shall contact maintenance 
technicians. This last process part represents the core of the proposed instantiation (see 
Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. FRAM instantiation of the manufacturing case study.  
 
Table 3. Application of the taxonomy to the manufacturing case study.  
 
Taxonomy category / 
Interaction  
I-1: Control oil level – Contact maintenance 
team 
I-2: Execute maintenance – Turn on the 
machine 
Nature of the agents Human/Individual – Human/Individual. Low 
variability. 
 
The operator in charge of the 6S activity 
(control oil level) is responsible for both 
controlling oil levels and contacting the 
maintenance technician, if the routine check is 
not positive.  
Human/Team – Human/Individual. Low variability. 
 
The maintenance team executes maintenance. The 
operator is responsible for the downstream action. 
The process information in this interaction refers to 
the flow from team’s actions to individual’s 
actions. 
 
Output nature State change. The output oil level controlled is 
a state change because the oil is not changing 
as a result of the function, but it rather has a 
different dimension.  
 
The output may be of acceptable precision, 
since the oil level is visually measured in terms 
of centimetres of oil on the end of the dip stick 
inserted. It may also be performed too early, 
when the machine is not yet cold. 
 
Entity. The output machine maintained has a 
physical nature which adds a key value step to the 
process of maintenance management.  
 
The output may be imprecise with respect to 
maintenance procedures. It may be too late 
depending on the delay from the original request.  
Levelling Levelled 
 
The number of maintenance requests is 
reasonably low, and basically the same over 
time, as confirmed by the fairly constant time 
between maintenance reported in the historic 
data. 
Unlevelled 
 
Both mix (type of maintenance intervention) and 
volume (number of man-hours required for the 
intervention) vary for each time the interaction is 
activated. 
Waiting time  Tight waiting time. Moderate variability. 
 
The interaction is generally performed in a 
short time interval (few minutes) to allow a 
prompt maintenance intervention. There is 
moderate variability, since in case of strict 
production plans it could be required to act 
Medium waiting time. High variability. 
 
The intervention are generally performed within 1 
hour (medium waiting time), but there is high 
variability due to the variability of required 
maintenance actions, which usually is assessed 
only when the team reach the machine.   
promptly, or vice versa, deferring it to allow 
the operator accommodating other priority 
requests. 
Distance  Medium distance. Low variability. 
 
The operator has to call the maintenance from 
the central office, which is located less than 50 
meters away from the machine. 
 
Short distance. Low variability. 
 
The distance is short and not relevant, since the 
maintenance action is conducted close to the 
machine. 
Degree of coupling Loosely-coupled.  
 
There are two alternative means of performing 
the interaction, i.e. calling the maintenance 
technicians through the operator’s personal 
phone or contact them by e-mail.  
Moderately-coupled.  
 
Generally there is at least one alternative way to 
perform the interaction, depending on the 
components. The coupling level of this interaction 
can be represented, as a proxy measure, by the 
number of maintenance procedures to perform the 
task, which can be stricter (requiring certified 
technician, or specific tools) for some type of 
intervention. 
Visibility  Moderate visibility. High variability. 
 
From the perspective of the downstream agent 
(i.e. maintenance technicians), visibility is 
moderate, since the operator does not 
necessarily refer the issues he is facing, due to 
her local understanding of the situation. It is 
highly variable, because it generally depends 
on the experience of the operator, and on the 
time available to properly assess the scenario. 
Moderate visibility. Moderate variability. 
 
The downstream agent generally has indirect 
sources of information. If the intervention is 
conducted during her work shift, she acknowledges 
the completion of the maintenance activity on 
person, otherwise the operator has to check the 
daily activity report in the main office. Variability 
emerges from such possible scenarios. 
 
Safety or security hazards No safety (and security) hazards. Low 
variability. 
 
The action is pretty straightforward with very 
limited potential for any type of risks for the 
operator. There is no security implication. 
The output has hazardous properties and the 
environment poses significant hazards to the 
output. High variability. 
No security hazards. 
 
Even if there is no security implications at this 
level, there could be safety issues, since an 
imprecisely executed maintenance may jeopardise 
the operator’s safety. It could be highly variable 
since there could be several combinations of events 
leading to critical consequences. 
 
Parallel replications Low number of parallel replications. Moderate 
variability. 
 
The same interaction is normally performed 
one time for work shift, but can be performed 
multiple times if different production plans 
require it. 
Medium number of parallel replications. Moderate 
variability. 
 
The same interaction is performed multiple times 
for the same machine, with the potential for 
multiple interventions, by different teams for 
different types of faults to be diagnosed and 
managed. 
  
 
From the usage of the taxonomy, it is possible to define some recommendations, on both 
technical and management aspects. For example, one criticality that emerges from both 
I-1 and I-2 refers to waiting time between making contact with maintenance team and the 
subsequent maintenance execution. In this case, referring to I-1 <control oil level> it is 
requested that the operator checks manually at the beginning of her work shift the 
machine oil level, and make contact only in case the level is not satisfactory. A 
recommendation in this case would suggest inviting the operator in taking note of the 
assessed oil level, as well as of the other 6S checks. The reported data would be useful to 
feed an algorithm which combines the production plan and the reported measures to better 
schedule the maintenance interventions, loosening the time pressure for downstream 
interactions.  
 
As a consequence, this process change would also imply benefits with respect to the 
visibility and on the levelling of the interactions, allowing the maintenance team to have 
more formal data for setting up properly the intervention. Such change would imply the 
shift towards a dynamic condition-based maintenance, relying on prognostic models. 
Following the analysis of the taxonomy’s items safety/security hazards, it is also 
recommended to promote toolbox meetings among maintenance teams in order to discuss 
the potential safety and production criticalities emerging from imprecise execution.  
  
7. Discussion  
 
7.1 Taxonomy assessment  
 
The feedback from the seven experts indicated, at least for those who already have 
experience with traditional FRAM, that the taxonomy items are acceptably easy to be 
interpreted and they do provide a helpful approach to deal with the complexity of socio-
technical systems (Figure 5). It can be inferred from this that, while the taxonomy 
increases the complexity of the FRAM analysis, it adds value to cope with the complexity 
of the representation.  
 
A useful feedback from two experts refers to the “safety hazard” and “security hazard” 
criteria. The experts recommended the use of this criteria to be accompanied by a punctual 
definition of what safe/unsafe (secure/unsecure) means in the specific case study under 
examination, rather than simply use the related label. Furthermore, one expert pointed out 
that the criteria “Levelling” and “Parallel Replications” may be not clearly 
understandable (cf. Figure 5). For such criteria, the descriptors were furtherly refined in 
the third iterative sub-process, in order to convey them in sufficiently abstract terms, so 
as they could be applicable across domains, and at the same time being precise enough 
for reliable assessments.  
 
The assessment also pointed out that analysing some features of an interaction may be 
unnecessary under certain circumstances. This comment emerges from Figure 5, where 
some experts assessed the criteria “Nature of agents variability”, “Safety (Security) 
hazard value/variability”, and “Parallel Replications” to be helpful at a small degree. For 
some systems such aspects would not be relevant, indicating that the taxonomy is 
intended to be flexible and better accommodate the analysts’ needs for the case at hand. 
The taxonomy may be used partially and in an ad-hoc manner, to the extent that it has 
utility for the analyst.             
 
 
Figure 5. Feedback by the seven experts involved in the study. 
 
7.2 Implications for resilience engineering 
 
In principle, the taxonomy can contribute to the operationalization of the four potentials 
of resilient systems defined by Hollnagel (2017), as discussed below:  
(i) The potential to respond implies knowing what to do, responding to regular and 
irregular changes and opportunities (Hollnagel, 2017). In this respect, the system re-
design recommendations discussed in the case studies illustrate how the taxonomy 
application can give rise to responses to either undesired or unsatisfactory characteristics 
of the interactions;  
(ii) The potential to monitor implies knowing what to look for, monitoring what could 
seriously affect performance in the near term, positively or negatively (Hollnagel, 2017). 
The taxonomy criteria may give rise to some metrics worth monitoring. For instance, the 
monitoring of the interaction levelling implies in the need for monitoring the rate and mix 
of output production at the upstream and consumption/use at the downstream function. 
This data might be useful for the re-design of the production resources – e.g. increasing 
capacity by adding more ATM;     
(iii) The potential to learn implies knowing what has happened, acquiring the right 
lessons from the right experience (Hollnagel, 2017). The FRAM can be interpreted as a 
learning platform (Clay-Williams et al., 2015), applicable both for modelling past events 
(e.g. accidents) as well as for a risk analysis, looking into future scenarios. Both situations 
offer learning opportunities, which can be enriched by a structured recording of the 
taxonomy application;   
(iv) The potential to anticipate implies knowing what to expect, preparing for 
developments further into the future, such as disruptions, constraints or opportunities 
(Hollnagel, 2017). This potential may benefit from the use of the taxonomy jointly with 
FRAM models focused on risk analysis, as well as from applying the variability 
descriptors. The variability of the interaction could be assessed considering longer time 
horizons into the future – e.g. which would the expected variability of the interaction 
within one year into the future?     
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The proposed taxonomy contributes to a deep understanding of the functional interactions 
in socio-technical systems. The two dimensions of the taxonomy descriptors (i.e. output 
characteristics from the viewpoint of the downstream function, and variability of the 
interaction) support the development of a structured database for recording the results of 
the analysis.  
 
The emphasis on describing the interactions and their variability (instead of being limited 
to the variability of the outputs) is a distinctive taxonomy’s feature in relation to the 
original FRAM. For example, the variability according to the “waiting time” criterion 
depends on the match between the rate of output production at upstream and the rate of 
the same output use by the downstream function. Similarly, the description of the criterion 
“distance”, and its corresponding variability, depends on the interaction between 
upstream and downstream function – i.e. a same upstream output may have different 
distance description and variability from the perspective of different downstream 
functions. As such, the taxonomy is a complementary analytical tool to the FRAM, by 
shedding light on system aspects that are implicit in FRAM models. Indeed, the taxonomy 
forces the FRAM model developers to make it explicit their assumptions on the nature of 
the interactions in the scenario considered. This can contribute to the development of 
more realistic models.     
 
The usefulness of the taxonomy was demonstrated through the analysis of three case 
studies in which work system re-design opportunities were identified. These opportunities 
may be logically connected to the four potentials of resilient systems, thus making a link 
between the taxonomy and re-design actions consistent with resilience engineering. 
Furthermore, the case studies suggest that all combinations between the taxonomy’s 
categories can be possible, which provides empirical evidence of the need for uncovering 
what is beneath the linear/non-linear versus tight/loose couplings taxonomy. The 
variability descriptor is also a recognition of the need for evaluating the interactions over 
time, instead of static snapshots.  
 
However, any taxonomy is a social construct and it is not definitive (Parasuraman et al., 
2008). As such, new conceptual and technological developments may imply in the need 
for revising the taxonomy criteria and its descriptors. Another limitation refers to the high 
number of interactions that may exist in FRAM models, which does not make it practical 
the full application of the taxonomy for all interactions. In order to overcome this 
limitation, two possibilities are the prioritization of some interactions for full taxonomy 
application and a partial application of the taxonomy. Furthermore, the taxonomy reliance 
on the FRAM can be seen as a limitation to the extent it may need to be adapted in order 
to be compatible with other modelling tools. Lastly, although the taxonomy was tested in 
different scenarios, its full generalizability depends on its application to other contexts.   
 
Some opportunities for future studies can be mentioned, namely: (i) to develop a metric 
to evaluate the complexity of FRAM models, based on the assignment of scores to the 
descriptors; (ii) to apply the taxonomy to a wide range of systems, in order to identify 
patterns that could set a basis for standardized taxonomies of socio-technical systems; 
and (iii) to adapt the taxonomy to other system modelling approaches, such as causal-
loop-diagrams and social network analysis.      
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